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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
arap Moi￿s administration was marked by political corruption. By 2002, Trans-
parency International ranked only ￿ve countries as more corrupt than Kenya.
Kibaki won the 2002 election after campaigning on an anti-corruption ticket.
He started by appointing Githong to investigate corruption, but sacked him as
Githong closed in on government ministers. Kibaki lost the 2007 parliamen-
tary election and possibly the presidential election against the ODM, who again
campaigned against corruption.
This story reminds us of two familiar lessons. The ￿r s ti st h a tv o t e r sd i s l i k e
corruption; the second is that good intentions can be forgotten once one obtains
access to power: as Acton put it, ￿power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely￿. Kenya￿s recent history also suggests that voters￿ dislike of corrupt
politicians and increasingly corrupt politicians may interact to produce a politi-
cal cycle in which corrupt governments are repeatedly turned out. The Christian
Democrat-led Italian governments also exemplify Acton￿s dictum, and Italian
citizens were clearly disaﬀected by the manifest corruption; yet the Christian
Democrats and their partners shared power for about forty years after WWII.
When do corrupt parties remain in government?
We investigate this question by analyzing a model of dynamic democracy,
where citizens vote and governments form in a sequence of elections. We focus on
Acton dictum￿s consequences by considering an environment which is stationary
except for the corrupting eﬀect of power on governing parties. We character-
ize one-period equilibria (the governments which form when parties have given
tastes for corruption), and ergodic sets (the long-run cycles of governments) as
a function of the salience of corruption and of the (￿xed) distribution of parties￿
ideal policies. These ergodic sets provide a natural language to describe long
periods with unchanged government composition (as in Italy and Austria), and
cycles in which coalitions replaced each other (as in Germany).
Our benchmark model is quite simple. At each election, citizens vote for one
of three parties. If some party secures a majority of votes then it is in power
(alone), and can unilaterally choose policy, which is represented as a scalar, and
its private consumption of graft. If no party secures a majority of votes then the
parties which secure some votes negotiate formation of a coalition government.
We model these negotiations axiomatically: requiring that the coalition govern-
ment be minimal (two parties); that the coalition with the greatest joint surplus
from an agreement over policy and graft forms the government; and that these
parties implement the agreement which jointly splits the maximal surplus.
The electorate consists of three sorts of citizen. Each sort has single-peaked
preferences over policy, and all citizens (equally) dislike corruption. Each party
has the same ideal policy as one of the citizen sorts. In contrast to citizens,
parties may also have a taste for graft. In our benchmark model, parties are
either are absolutely corrupt, in the sense that they only care for graft, or
absolutely pure, in the sense that they have no taste for graft, and only care for
policy.
We characterize the strong equilibria of this one-election game for any con-
2￿guration of party tastes for corruption. This solution concept implies that the
government which forms is that most preferred by median citizens out of the
three parties in power alone and the coalition which would form were parlia-
ment hung. The twist on a standard median voter model is that median citizens
cannot control the outcome of negotiations in a hung parliament. The equilib-
rium outcome coincides with the core of the voting game played by citizens,
conditional on party behavior.1
We then study a dynamic version of this game, in which citizens vote re-
peatedly, and parties￿ tastes evolve according to when they were last in power:
a party which was last in government is absolutely corrupt, and a party which
was last in opposition is absolutely pure. (This is what we mean by Acton￿s
dictum.) We side-step time consistency issues by supposing that citizens￿ and
parties￿ horizon is the length of the current government; so play across elec-
tions consists of equilibria in the sequence of one-election games because parties
do not adjust current policy to aﬀect their prospects in the next election. We
characterize the unique ergodic set of this dynamic process: that is, a cycle of
governments which, once reached, is never left.2
We obtain several intuitively plausible results in this set-up. In particular,
coalitions can only share power temporarily, and only the median party can
be perpetually in power. The median party then always chooses a constant,
positive level of graft; so such an ergodic set exists if and only if corruption is
suﬃciently non-salient, and the other parties are suﬃciently uncompetitive in
the sense that their ideal policies are extreme enough. By contrast, the median
party would always be in power and take no graft if parties could commit to
their programs before an election.
If corruption is salient enough then parties may share power in the ergodic
set. However, the only coalition government which can form after an election
(on or oﬀ the ergodic path) consists of the two absolutely pure, non-median
parties. This coalition alternates in power with the median party in the ergodic
set if its two members￿ ideal policies are about equally extreme relative to the
median citizen￿s ideal. There is never any corruption in such an ergodic set.
The argument for uniqueness of equilibrium coalitions turns on a couple
of negative results. A coalition of absolutely corrupt parties cannot form a
government in a hung parliament because there must always be an absolutely
pure party, as the previous government was minimal winning; and an agreement
between an absolutely pure and an absolutely corrupt party yields a greater joint
surplus. On the other hand, an absolutely pure and an absolutely corrupt party
cannot share power because they would agree to the absolutely pure party￿s
ideal policy and allow the absolutely corrupt party to take some graft; so all
citizens would prefer the absolutely pure party in power than sharing power.
Two corrupt parties which share power agree to less aggregate graft than
either would choose when in power; but the median party is always in power
in the ergodic set when corruption is suﬃciently non-salient. The ergodic set
1Preferences are structured such that the core is non-empty, even though government
choices are two-dimensional.
2A single party that is always in power is a special case of an ergodic set.
3may therefore be suboptimal in the following sense: if corruption is suﬃciently
non-salient then median citizens are better oﬀ when the median party always
s h a r e sp o w e rt h a nw h e ni ti sa l w a y si np o w e r .
Various of these results rely on our benchmark assumption that a party last
in government [resp. opposition] is absolutely corrupt [resp. pure]: for example,
corruption can be cyclical and policy-connected parties can temporarily share
power if parties may care about both policy and graft. However, our benchmark
results imply that a single coalition cannot always share power if they eventu-
ally become absolutely corrupt. This prediction is diﬃcult to square with the
decades-long coalitions in Austria and Italy. The benchmark results also imply
that a corrupt enough party cannot share power with a pure enough party. This
implication seems inconsistent with Shas￿s participation in Israeli governments
led by Rabin and by Netanyahu. Shas, an ultra-orthodox party, is far more
concerned with public funding of its educational system than with relations
with the Palestinians, and has therefore been a natural partner of both doveish
and hawkish parties. Similarly, the Progressive Democrats shared power with
Fianna Fail after the 1989 Irish election, having campaigned against the lat-
ter￿s corruption. This episode was repeated in 1992, when Labour joined the
coalition.
Accordingly, we study play in two variants on the benchmark model:
If parties can commit to share power with each other if they jointly win
the election then the median party may always share power in an ergodic set.
Commitments preclude inter-party negotiations and prevent the median party
from being in power alone. Median citizens are worse oﬀ in this ergodic set than
in the benchmark model.
If citizens vote expressively (for the party they would most prefer in power)
rather than strategically then other coalitions are, of course possible. We have
a much stronger result: the only coalition which can form in an ergodic set
consists of a pure and a corrupt party. Citizens who vote expressively may vote
in a government which chooses an extreme policy, and may replace one corrupt
government with another one.
From a methodological point of view, our model is closest to Baron and
Diermeier (2001): in both papers, citizens vote repeatedly for parties which
cannot precommit to policy; coalitions are negotiated in a hung parliament;
and players have a one-election horizon.3 The main diﬀerences are substantive.
First, Baron and Diermeier assume that a randomly chosen formateur makes a
single oﬀer, with the last policy as the status quo, which may therefore determine
the equilibrium coalition. By contrast, the status quo is irrelevant in all of the
models we analyze; and introducing a formateur into our benchmark model
may eliminate all coalition governments. Second, we assume that a minimal
winning government forms, whereas their model implies that a party which
secures a majority of votes would typically negotiate a coalition government.
Single-party governments are therefore impossible in their model, but typical
in our model. Third, preferences are constant in Baron and Diermeier: only
3Baron, Diermeier and Fong (2007) drop the last assumption.
4the status quo evolves, changing every period in equilibrium; whereas tastes for
corruption evolve in our model. Finally, in contrast to Baron and Diermeier and
the subsequent literature, we can use our model to calculate ergodic sets.
From a substantive point of view, our model is related most closely to My-
erson (2006) and Volden and Wiseman (2007), who also treat corruption as
graft. Myerson supposes that citizens care (heterogeneously) about a binary
decision, while candidates are exogenously endowed with a taste for graft. The
binary structure precludes coalition formation, which is an essential aspect of
our model. On the other hand, we ￿x an electoral system, whereas Myerson
compares equilibrium corruption across electoral systems.
Volden and Wiseman (2007) use a standard noncooperative bargaining model
to study coalition formation among any ￿xed number of legislators, who have
the same preference ordering over policy, but may trade oﬀ policy and graft dif-
ferently. This apparatus, in which agreements can be delayed, is inappropriate
for our purposes because, unlike the previous literature, we also study sequences
of elections, and therefore model inter-party negotiations axiomatically. Volden
and Wiseman also ￿nd that a pure and a corrupt party may share power in a
hung parliament; but we endogenize the distribution of votes, showing that such
a hung parliament would never be elected in equilibrium.
We model corruption as graft chosen by myopic parties whose preferences
change over time; whereas the literature on pork studies corruption as a means
for parties with ￿xed preferences to ￿nance re-election. Pork necessarily results
in an incumbency advantage; we show that graft may result in an incumbency
advantage or disadvantage, as the Israeli and Kenyan examples suggest.
Corruption may vary over time in our model because power corrupts. A
related literature attributes time-varying corruption to multiple equilibria (cf.
Tirole (1996) and Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002)), and to the depletion of an
incumbent￿s resources in Bicchieri and Duﬀy( 1997).
We de￿ne our benchmark model in Section 2 and characterize equilibria
and ergodic sets in Section 3. We extend the benchmark model by allowing
for intermediate tastes for graft in Section 4, prior commitments to coalition
partners in Section 5, and expressive voting in Section 6. We conclude in Section
7, noting how the model might be extended to bicameral elections. We provide
formal statements and proofs in the Appendix.
2 Benchmark model
We describe our benchmark model in this section. We present this model in a
form which covers worlds with two and with three parties, even though most of
our analysis concerns the latter case.
We analyze a game played over an in￿nite number of periods . Each period
starts with an election, in which each citizen casts a vote for a party or abstains.
A party which receives a majority of the votes cast is ￿in power￿; it chooses the
government￿s program, which consists of policy and the graft it enjoys.4 If none
4We treat ￿corruption￿ and ￿graft￿ as synonyms below.
5of the parties receive a majority of votes then they bargain over government
composition and its program. We say that the parties in government ￿share
power￿. A period ends after the government implements its chosen or agreed
program. We ￿rst spell out and discuss details of the one-period game, and then
describe the full (multi-period) game.
2.1 One-period game
Programs We identify a government￿s program with a scalar policy (denoted
x) and with the (non-negative) scalar graft which each party i receives (denoted
yi).5 Each citizen￿s welfare depends on both policy and on graft; but while
citizens diﬀer as to the ideal policy, graft (aka corruption) can only bene￿tt h e
recipient party, and represent a direct cost to all other parties. Graft could
therefore be thought of as graft or as a means to ￿nance electoral expenditures.
It is important to distinguish such corruption from pork, as studied by Baron
(1991) inter alia, which represents the diversion of public resources to a subset
of citizens. We also suppose that the aggregate quantity of graft is endogenous:
an assumption shared by Myerson (2006) and Volden and Wiseman (2007). By
contrast, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and the related literature suppose that
there is a ￿xed quantity of graft to be divided amongst parties in government;
so its distribution does not aﬀect citizens￿ welfare.
Citizens A ￿nite number of citizens is divided into three sorts, indexed by
i ∈ {L,M,R}, according to their preferences over policy. Citizens of sort i have
preferences over a program represented by




where ε ∈ (0,1] and β is positive, so xi is the ideal policy for citizens of sort i.
We will refer to β[.] as the ￿policy costs￿ of a government. We suppose that γ is
also positive; so, in contrast to pork, corruption is equally costly for all citizens,
and may generate an incumbency disadvantage. We will explain why we treat
policy costs as a convex combination of quadratic and linear terms in Section 4.
We suppose that xL <x M <x R; so we will refer to citizens of sort L as
￿leftists￿, citizens of sort M as ￿moderates￿, and citizens of sort R as ￿rightists￿.
It will prove convenient to normalize xM at 0;t ow r i t exR as d and xL as −θ−d;
and to assume that d and θ are both positive: which implies that a leftist￿s ideal
policy is relatively more extreme than a rightist￿s.
We focus on the interesting case, in which neither leftists nor rightists form
a majority. It is easy to extend our results to the other cases.
A strategy for a citizen is a vote for a party in {L,M,R} or an abstention.6
It is convenient to assume a PR election in a single constituency; but our results
may also apply to winner-take-all elections in several constituencies.
5We write y for the vector of graft.
6Abstentions do not play a role in our analysis.
6We will say that citizens vote ￿sincerely￿ if every sort i citizen votes for party
i.
Parties We treat parties as citizens who may develop a taste for graft if and
only if they have been in government. Speci￿cally, for every sort i of citizen









where α is positive and mi represents some transferable currency (such as cab-
inet posts) whose distribution satis￿es
P
mi = M where M is large. There
are, therefore, three parties: L, M and R. We will drop the quali￿er ￿party￿
whenever it can be inferred from context.
In contrast to the citizen-candidate literature, we ￿x the number of parties:7
citizens who ￿nd that their party is corrupt cannot form a competing pure party
(as in Myerson (2006)).
We will refer to ci as i￿s taste for corruption and suppose that it is in the
interval [0,1]. We will say that i is absolutely pure if ci =0 , and absolutely
corrupt if ci =1 . In the benchmark model, every party is either absolutely
corrupt or absolutely pure; but we allow for intermediate tastes (viz. ci ∈ (0,1))
in Section 4. To simplify exposition, we will drop the quali￿er ￿absolutely￿
whenever it can be inferred from context.
We include a normalization constant, −c2
iα/4γ, to ensure that party i￿s ideal
policy and graft yield it a payoﬀ of 0, irrespective of ci.
An absolutely corrupt party (say, i) does not care about policy. We will
treat party i￿s behavior as its limiting choices for a sequence of tastes {ci}
which approach 1. In particular, we will suppose that it would choose its ideal
p o l i c yw h e ni np o w e r .
Government formation If any party secures more than half of the votes
cast then it forms a government alone, choosing the program which maximize
its payoﬀ. We say that the party is then ￿in power￿.
There are two cases in which no party secures a majority of votes:
In the ￿rst case, two parties each secure half of all votes cast. We assume that
each party is then equally likely to be in power. This assumption is plausible if
parties lose representatives by natural attrition - so such coalitions are unstable.
We adopt the assumption because it precludes putative solutions which seem to
require too much coordination among citizens.8
In the other case, all three parties secure some votes. We then say that
there is a ￿hung parliament￿. A government can then only be formed by two or
more parties, who must negotiate the government￿s program. We say that these
parties ￿share power￿. We also say that a party is ￿in government￿ if it is either
in or shares power, and that it is otherwise ￿in opposition￿.
7See, for example, Besley and Coate (1997).
8The alternative assumption does not aﬀect our results qualitatively: it only changes the
conditions under which two pure parties can share power.
7The literature on government formation has focussed on hung parliaments,
exploring play in particular extensive form bargaining models. In the literature
inspired by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), parties continue to bargain - potentially
inde￿nitely - until a winning coalition reaches agreement.9 We eschew such
models, despite their evident attractions, because we are interested in the dy-
namics of government formation across elections. On the other hand, we want
to abstract away from the order in which parties move (and therefore the for-
mateur￿s role), which is crucial in ￿nite bargaining models like Austen-Smith
and Banks (1988). Accordingly, we adopt an axiomatic approach to inter-party
bargaining, which easily delivers some simple and, we believe, robust properties
of such negotiations.
We start with a de￿nition. We say that an agreement between parties i and
j yields a ￿surplus￿ of maxx,y vi(x,y)+vj(x,y).
We suppose that:
A. A minimal winning (two-party) coalition always forms;
B. The parties which form a government reach a mutually eﬃcient agreement
on a program which divides their surplus equally. If the maximal surplus is
independent of policy then the parties agree to policy (xi + xj)/2;a n d
C. The coalition whose putative agreement maximizes its members￿ payoﬀ
forms the government.
Taken literally, Condition A is empirically problematic; but we only use it
to exclude the grand coalition. This ensures that some party is in opposition,
and therefore pure. Condition A could therefore be relaxed in generalizations
of our model to more than three parties.
The ￿rst part of Condition B is in the spirit of Baron and Diermeier (2001),
inter alia, who study noncooperative models of eﬃcient proto-coalitional bar-
gaining. The crucial feature of Condition B is that the agreement is mutually
eﬃcient. This will imply that a corrupt and a pure party would agree to the
pure party￿s ideal policy: which is the basis for Lemma 3.2 below. The premise
of the second part of Condition B is satis￿ed if ci = cj =1 .
Condition C is redundant if only two parties secure votes. It will otherwise
imply that a corrupt party has more to gain by reaching agreement with a pure
party than with another corrupt party. Volden and Wiseman (2007) derive this
rather natural property in a noncooperative bargaining model without elections.
Conditions A-C may be satis￿ed by more than one pair of parties. We then
allow citizens to believe that any such pair might share power.10
Conditions A-C seem to be natural properties of inter-party negotiations.
However, they may fail in some institutional settings: for example, when ne-
gotiations are conducted by a formateur. We will discuss the implications of a
formateur mechanism in Section 3.4.
The combination of Conditions A, B and C allows us to characterize the
government￿s membership and program after any election. In particular, it
allows us to bracket out party choices; so we can treat citizens as the only
9See, for example, Volden and Wiseman (2007).
10This turns out to be relevant in proving Proposition 3.1d.
8active players in in our benchmark model.11
Note that parties which share power agree on corruption as well as policy.
We interpret such agreements as the indirect consequence of assigning ministries,
which allow parties to control departmental resources.
One-period game Formally, the game is played by the set of citizens, whose
strategy is a vote for one of the parties or abstention. Our assumptions above
characterize the government program after any electoral outcome for any triple
of tastes {ci}, and thereby each citizen￿s payoﬀ at any strategy combination.
Solution concept The one-period game possesses multiple Nash equilibria
because a citizen is indiﬀerent across her strategies unless she is pivotal; and
any feasible government can be elected at a strategy combination where no cit-
izen is pivotal. Accordingly, we analyze the one-period game by characterizing
its strong equilibria: strategy combinations in which no set of citizens have a
pro￿table joint deviation. This re￿nement implies that moderates determine
government composition. We simplify exposition by referring to strong strategy
combinations as ￿equilibria￿. We will characterize the equilibrium correspon-
dence: viz. the equilibria for every triple of tastes and parameters {d,θ,α,β,γ}.
Citizens of the same sort can choose diﬀerent strategies in equilibrium. In-
deed, various strategy combinations can support a given outcome; equilibrium
pins down the governments that form (and therefore outcomes) rather than
strategy combinations.
Incumbency eﬀects A candidate of a given party has an incumbency ad-
vantage, in conventional terms, if she is more likely to be elected as the in-
cumbent than as the challenger. We can use the equilibrium correspondence
to de￿ne incumbency eﬀects for ￿xed parameters. A party has an incumbency
advantage if a game in which it is corrupt (and therefore an incumbent) has an
equilibrium in which it is in government; and a game in which it is pure has an
equilibrium in which it is in opposition.12 We de￿ne incumbency disadvantage
analogously.
Characterizing programs We characterize the program chosen and each
citizen￿s payoﬀ for every possible government in Lemma A2.1, which we provide
in the Appendix. We will repeatedly invoke Lemma A2.1 when proving further
results.
Lemma A2.1 implies that any government￿s chosen corruption is propor-
tional to α/γ: the proportion depending on the tastes of government members.
Consequently, the cost of corruption to a citizen is also proportional to α/γ.
The parameter δ, which we de￿ne as α/βγ, therefore measures a citizen￿s trade-
oﬀ between policy and realized corruption. We will refer to δ as the ￿salience￿ of
corruption: an interpretation which seems to be consistent with the widespread
use of salience in empirical studies.13 Salience is a suﬃcient statistic for {α,β,γ}
in many of our results. We will ignore some non-generic sets of parameters in
which δ satis￿es particular quadratic equations in d and θ.
11We will treat parties as active players in Section 5.
12Note that a given party may be in or may be excluded from several possible governments.
13See, for example, Epstein and Segal (2000) on empirical proxies for salience when surveys
are unavailable.
9Lemma A2.1 implies that aggregate corruption is higher when two corrupt
parties share power than when a pure and a corrupt party share power. More
strikingly, inter-party negotiations internalize the costs of corruption suﬃciently
that they choose less graft in aggregate than an (absolutely) corrupt party in
power. This will prove important below, as moderates may prefer to elect a
hung parliament. The property holds whenever private bene￿ts and costs are
respectively polynomial and convex in graft. Example A2.1, which we present
in the Appendix, illustrates how this condition could fail if private bene￿ts are
concave enough in graft. On the other hand, the condition may also hold in
models where citizens punish governing parties, and coalition government blurs
responsibility for past corruption: cf. Tavits (2007).
An eﬃcient agreement between a pure and a corrupt party must cede policy
choice to the pure party in return for some graft for the corrupt party. Lemma
A2.1 speci￿es the surplus-maximizing graft. It also, crucially, implies that a
coalition of a pure and a corrupt party yields a larger surplus than a coalition of
two corrupt parties. This natural property also holds in Volden and Wiseman￿s
(2007) model of a heterogeneous legislature. In contrast to their model, corrupt
parties which share power choose more graft, the less salient is corruption.14
2.2 Multi-period game
Our analysis of the one-period game studies play with ￿xed tastes for corruption.
We extend this analysis to capture Acton￿s dictum by considering play in a
sequence of periods, where the only link between periods is the eﬀect of power
on tastes for corruption.
Formally, a dynamic process maps a strategy combination for citizens (say,
s) and current tastes for graft (c ≡ {cL,c M,c R}) into the next period￿s tastes.
We write this Markovian process as Γ(c,s).
In the benchmark model, we suppose that a party is (absolutely) corrupt if it
was in government in the last period, and that it is otherwise (absolutely) pure.
We extend our results to more general dynamic processes, in which parties may
have intermediate tastes for corruption, in Section 4.
We do not provide a model of ￿changing tastes￿, but Acton￿s dictum is con-
sistent with a number of stories in which individuals￿ preferences are ￿xed:
for example, parties in government may develop the skills needed to rob the
public purse; or parties which implement new policies may need ideologically
neutral but self-interested experts, who eventually determine the government￿s
program.15 Gary Hart￿s remark about superdelegates, ￿A reformer in oﬃce be-
comes an establishment ￿gure by de￿nition and then by de￿nition resists the
next round of reforms ￿ it￿s human nature￿ (NYT 02/17/08) suggests another
mechanism.16
14Their Proposition 2 relies, inter alia, on common preferences over policy.
15Weinstein (2005) describes a similar eﬀect on the composition of rebel groups.
16della Porta and Pizzorno (1996) discuss Italian corruption in terms of the breakdown of
parties, the emergence of secret networks and the corrupting of individuals.
10Acton￿s dictum is usually invoked to explain the eﬀects of exercising power;
so its converse, the purifying eﬀects of opposition, is rarely mentioned. Nev-
ertheless, this eﬀect may explain why policy-driven activists sometimes move
parties which have left government away from the political center. Examples
include the Goldwater candidacy, and the paths taken by the UK Labour party
under Michael Foot after losing the 1979 election and the Tories under William
Hague and Ian Duncan-Smith after losing the 1997 election.
We also suppose that the time which elapses between elections is long enough
that citizens and parties only care about the next government￿s program. Parties
have no incentive to divert public resources to ￿nance re-election campaigns, and
citizens￿ payoﬀs are their returns, ui(x,y) from the next government￿s program.
This assumption allows us to evade the time-consistency issues which models
of changing tastes otherwise raise. It also implies that citizens do not punish
parties for their performance in past governments;17 and that parties do not
reduce current corruption to improve their subsequent electability.18 This allows
us to analyze play in each period by characterizing its equilibria.
We study the in￿uence of successive elections in an environment where cit-
izens￿ preferences over programs are ￿xed by characterizing the multi-period
game￿s long-run cycles, calling our solution concept an ￿ergodic set￿. Formally,
an ergodic set is a ￿nite sequence of pairs {ct,s t}t=T
t=1 such that st is an equi-
librium in the one-period game when parties have tastes ct; and tastes evolve
according to the dynamic process ct+1 = Γ(ct,s t):w h e r ew ei d e n t i f yp e r i o d s1
and T +1. The composition of government may therefore be constant or cyclical
in an ergodic set.
3 Benchmark results
In this section, we characterize equilibria and ergodic sets in the benchmark
model, where parties are either (absolutely) pure or (absolutely) corrupt. We
provide our main results in Section 3.1. I nS e c t i o n3 . 2 ,w ed e m o n s t r a t et h a t
there are nonergodic cycles in which moderates are better oﬀ than in the ergodic
set. In Section 3.3, we compare our results with ergodic sets in related models
where a formateur chooses its partner. In Section 3.4, we compare benchmark
results with equilibria and ergodic sets in a model with two parties. We collect
and discuss some of the benchmark model￿s testable implications in Section 3.5.
3.1 Three parties
Our ￿rst result in this subsection characterizes equilibria of any one-period game
which follows a minimal winning government: so at least one party is pure and
17In practice, a government cannot fully precommit to its program, which is adjusted
throughout its term in oﬃce; and, close enough to the end of a term, it is chosen to en-
sure reelection. We will return to this issue in the Conclusion.
18Baron (1996) analyzes a related eﬀect.
11at least one party is corrupt. While the outcomes speci￿ed in Proposition 3.1
only depend on salience (δ), equilibrium payoﬀs depend on β and on α/γ.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibria) In generic one-period games:
a. If M is pure then it is in power.
b. If M and R are corrupt then L is in power if
4[ε(d + θ)2 +( 1− ε)(d + θ)] <δ ;
and M is otherwise in power.
c. If L and M are corrupt then M is in power if δ<4[εd2 +( 1− ε)d];a n d
R is otherwise in power.
d. If M is the only corrupt party then M is in power if δ<4[εd2 +(1−ε)d];
L and R share power if and only if
θ<2d and 4[ε(2d + θ)2 +( 1− ε)(2d + θ)] <δ ;
and R is otherwise in power.
Proof
There are four possible governments in any one-period game: each of the
parties in power, and the coalition which would form in a hung parliament. We
start with some useful preliminary results, which pin down the possible coalition
governments.
Lemma 3.1 Two parties cannot split all of the votes cast equally in any
equilibrium.
Proof If i and j were to split all votes cast equally then every citizen would
be pivotal. For generic parameters, citizens k/ ∈ {i,j} strictly prefer one of the
two parties (say, i) to be in power, and must therefore all vote for that party.
Some citizens i must then have a pro￿table deviation to voting for party i.¥
Lemma 3.1 implies that each party must secure some votes in a hung par-
liament.
Lemma 3.2 Two corrupt parties do not share power in any equilibrium.
Proof Lemma 2.1b implies that an agreement between the two corrupt par-
ties yields a lower surplus than the other two possible agreements; so Condition
C in Section 2 implies that the corrupt parties would not share power in a hung
parliament.¥
Lemma 3.3 A corrupt and a pure party do not share power in any equilibrium.
12Proof Denote the pure party by i. Lemma 2.1b implies that the two parties
would agree to policy xi and to some corruption. All citizens must then prefer
that i be in power.¥
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply that any coalition government must consist of
two pure parties. Our next result pins this possibility down further:
a. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which M does not get a majority of
votes. This means that either two parties share power or that a party other
than M secures a majority of the votes cast. Policy is x 6=0 ,a n dt h e r em a y
also be some corruption. In this case, a coalition of moderates and citizens who
top-rank a policy with the opposite sign to x have a pro￿table deviation to
voting for M. Conversely, there is an equilibrium in which all citizens vote for
M.
We will use part a to prove
Lemma 3.4 There is a unique equilibrium outcome. The government which
forms is top-ranked by moderates out of the three single-party gov-
ernments and the coalition which would form were parliament hung.
Proof Part a implies this result when M is pure; so suppose that M is
corrupt.
Denote the party which moderates most prefer to be in power by K.N o
other party can be in power in an equilibrium because some citizens who do not
vote for K have a pro￿table joint deviation to doing so.
If some party other than M is also corrupt then Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply
that each citizen top-ranks a single party in power. There must then be an
equilibrium in which all citizens vote for K. Conversely, no other government
can form because citizens who vote for the corrupt party in the coalition can
pro￿tably jointly deviate to voting for the pure party. Accordingly, suppose
henceforth that L and R are both pure.
Lemma 2.1b implies that L and R only share power in a hung parliament if
δ>4[ε(2d + θ)2 +( 1− ε)(2d + θ)].( 3 . 1)
If (3.1) fails then the argument in the last paragraph again implies the result.
Accordingly, suppose that (3.1)h o l d s .I ti se a s yt oc o n ￿rm that moderates then
prefer L and R to share power over M in power.
The coalition￿s program is a policy of −θ/2 and no graft; so moderates and
rightists prefer the coalition government over L in power, precluding the latter
government. Two possibilities remain:
￿ If moderates top-rank R in power then rightists must also do so. There
must then be an equilibrium in which all citizens vote for R, and no other
government can form in equilibrium.
￿ If moderates prefer the coalition government over M or R in power then so
do leftists. There is then an equilibrium in which all citizens vote sincerely
because (3.1) implies that rightists also prefer the coalition government
13over M in power. No party can be in power because at least two sorts of
citizen prefer the coalition government.¥
b. If M and R are both corrupt then the only possible governments are L
and M in power. Moderates respectively earn
−β[ε(d + θ)2 +( 1− ε)(d + θ)]
and −α/4γ when L and M are in power, so this part follows from Lemma 3.4.
c. The proof follows the same lines as that of part b.
d. If M is alone corrupt then the only governments which can be formed
in equilibrium are M in power, R in power and L and R sharing power. Now
moderates prefer M in power over R in power if and only if δ<4[εd2+(1−ε)d].
This condition implies that M is in power because (3.1)t h e nf a i l s .C o n v e r s e l y ,
Lemma 3.4 implies that M is not in power if the condition fails.
L and R can only share power if moderates prefer that R share power with
L than that it be in power (viz. d>2θ) and that they form a coalition in a
hung parliament (viz. (3.1)), which implies that moderates prefer a coalition
government over M in power. The result then follows from Lemma 3.4.¥
Lemma 3.2 states that two corrupt parties do not share power in any equilib-
rium. It follows from an implication of Lemma 2.1b: that an agreement between
two corrupt parties yields a smaller surplus than an agreement between a pure
and a corrupt party. The latter pair can gain more from trade because there
is no con￿ict of interest over policy. This property also holds in Volden and
Wiseman (2007).
Lemma 3.3 states that a corrupt and a pure party do not share power in any
equilibrium: the reason being that such parties would agree to the pure party￿s
ideal policy and some graft (cf. Lemma 2.1b), so all citizens are better oﬀ if
the pure party is in power. This argument, which relies on endogenizing the
legislature￿s composition, distinguishes our results from Volden and Wiseman
(2007).
Inspection of Proposition 3.1 reveals that no party has an incumbency ad-
vantage in the benchmark model: M is never in opposition in successive periods,
while the other two parties are never in government in successive periods. This
result relies on the absence of eﬀects which explain an incumbency advantage
in Congress, such as ￿nancing re-election campaigns (pork) and information
on candidates, which may deter high-quality challengers from entering. How-
ever, we will argue in subsequent sections that the result does not generalize to
variants on the benchmark model which also omit these conventional features.
Inspection of Proposition 3.1 also reveals that each party has an incumbency
disadvantage for some parameters.
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply that only pure parties can share power, even
though Lemma 2.1 implies that negotiations between a corrupt and a pure party
or between two corrupt parties would internalize the costs of corruption. It is
therefore not surprising that only pure parties can share power in a variant of
the model where parties in power unilaterally choose graft, rather than negotiate
14it. Indeed, it is easy to show that all of the results on government composition
in this section hold for such a game.
Proposition 3.1 speci￿es unique equilibrium governments after any history.
We now use this result for one-period games to construct the ergodic set in
multi-period games, exploiting our assumption that citizens have a one-election
horizon:
Proposition 3.2 (Ergodic sets) There is a unique ergodic set:
a. If θ<2d and 4[ε(2d + θ)2 +( 1− ε)(2d + θ)] <δthen M is in power
in alternate periods, and L and R share power in the other periods. No
government chooses any graft. Moderates earn 0 and −β[εθ
2+2(1−ε)θ]/4
in alternate periods.
b. If 4[εd2 +( 1− ε)d] <δand if 2d<θor
δ<4[ε(2d + θ)2 +( 1− ε)(2d + θ)]
then M and R alternate in power, and neither government chooses any
graft. Moderates earn 0 and −β[εd2 +( 1− ε)d] in alternate periods.
c. If δ<4[εd2 +( 1− ε)d] then M is always in power, and always chooses
some graft. Moderates earn −α/4γ each period.¥
We omit the proof of Proposition 3.2 because it follows easily from Proposi-
tion 3.1.
If M is pure then its program is ideal for moderates; so it must be in power
(cf. Lemma A3.4). If corruption is salient enough then citizens vote out each
party in government. The critical level of salience trades oﬀ reduced corruption
against worse policy when M is turned out of government. M must then al-
ternate in power either with R or with a coalition of L and R;a n dt h e s et w o
parties can only share power if an agreement between them yields more surplus
than an agreement between one of them and (corrupt) M. Neither of these
putative governments would choose any graft; so moderates rank them on the
basis of their policies. If θ<2d then the coalition policy (−θ/2)i sc l o s e rt ot h e
moderates￿ ideal policy; so M then alternates in power with the coalition.
M is always in power (and chooses its ideal policy) if corruption is suﬃciently
non-salient relative to the policy diﬀerences between M and its nearest rival (R).
This result is consistent with Rundquist et al￿s (1977) argument that citizens
trade oﬀ corruption against policy costs.
These arguments imply that policy is never both positive and negative in
any ergodic set: either it is constant (when there is no turnover) or it switches
between 0 and d (when M alternates in power with R )o ri ts w i t c h e sb e t w e e n
0 and −θ/2 (when M alternates with a coalition of L and R). In the latter two
cases, policy never changes by an amount more than d.
Suppose that M is corrupt. If θ is small enough (so L and R are almost
equally extreme) then moderates prefer that L and R share power than that
either M or R be in power. However, L and R can only share power if their
15agreement yields a larger surplus than an agreement between M and a pure
party: which requires that corruption be very salient. Consequently, the condi-
tions for M to always be in power are independent of θ, only depending on how
competitive R is for the votes of moderates. Measures of citizen heterogeneity
like polarization also depend on θ, and therefore do not track corruption in this
model.19
We can use Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 to show that the ergodic set is reached
after at most two elections, starting from any initial minimal winning govern-
ment (so at least party is pure and at least one party is corrupt).
3.2 Optimality
Lemma 3.4 states that moderates eﬀectively choose the equilibrium government
from the quadruple of the three parties in power and the coalition which emerges
from a hung parliament. This suggests that moderates may sometimes top-rank
a coalition government which does not emerge from a hung parliament.
In this subsection, we show that the ergodic set may be suboptimal in the
following sense: there is a cycle where tastes evolve as in the benchmark model
in which moderates are at least as well oﬀ in every period and otherwise better
oﬀ than in the ergodic set.20 This optimality criterion respects citizens￿ myopia
(their one-election horizon). It amounts to allowing moderates to choose which
parties share power in a hung parliament.
Proposition 3.1 implies that M either alternates in power or is always in
power in every ergodic set. We consider these ergodic sets in sequence, starting
with the former case.
A government of pure M chooses moderates￿ ideal program; so pure M must
also be in power after alternate elections in any improving cycle. As the cycle
satis￿es the benchmark version of Acton￿s dictum, M m u s ta l o n eb ec o r r u p ti n
the alternate elections. Consequently, every possible coalition must contain a
pure party.
Suppose that an agreement between L and R yields a larger surplus than one
between M and a pure party. Moderates are better oﬀ with the pure party in
power than sharing power with M ( c f .L e m m a3 . 3 ) ;s on oc y c l ew h i c hs a t i s ￿es
Acton￿s dictum can improve on the ergodic set. Now consider the other case,
Lemma 2.1 implies that
￿ An agreement between L and R yields a smaller surplus than one between
M and a pure party; and
￿ Moderates prefer L and R to share power over either M or R in power
if and only if θ<2d and
εθ
2 +2 ( 1− ε)θ<δ<4[ε(2d + θ)2 +2 ( 1− ε)(2d + θ)].( 3 . 2 )
19See Esteban and Ray (1994) for a formal de￿nition of polarization.
20In light of Lemma A3.4, leftists and rightists can obviously do better than in the ergodic
set.
16If θ<2d, (3.2) and the conditions in the premise of Proposition 3.2d hold then
a cycle in which M alternates in power with a coalition of the pure improves on
the ergodic set.
In every other ergodic set, M is always in power. This ergodic set is sub-
optimal if and only if moderates are better oﬀ when M and R always share
p o w e ro rw h e nM alternates in power. The former condition is satis￿ed when
2εd2 +4 ( 1− ε)d<δ : corruption is suﬃciently salient that moderates prefer
to sacri￿ce policy for the lower aggregate graft agreed by two corrupt parties.
This preference is irrelevant in the ergodic set because two corrupt parties never
share power.
Lemma 3.4 and the argument for the other ergodic sets imply that moderates
are better oﬀ when M is corrupt if and only if θ<2d and inequalities (3.2) hold.
These conditions imply that moderates are better oﬀ in every period when M
alternates in power with a coalition of L and R.
In sum,
Proposition 3.3 Moderates may be better oﬀ than in the ergodic set in cycles
where M alternates in power with a coalition of L and R, and in cycles
where M and R always share power.¥
3.3 Formateurs
In the last subsection, we attributed the ergodic set￿s suboptimality to Con-
dition C in Section 2, which requires that a coalition which yields the largest
surplus share power. In this subsection, we analyze variants on the benchmark
model where negotiations are conducted via a formateur. We suppose, follow-
ing Diermeier et al (2003), that the formateur negotiates with, rather than
makes exclusive proposals to, a chosen protocoalition. Speci￿cally, the forma-
teur shares power with that party whose agreed program with the formateur
yields the larger joint surplus.
We consider two variants, which are based on the empirical ￿nding that
the ￿rst formateur is usually either the last prime minister or the leader of the
largest party.21 We analyze these cases in sequence.
If a previous incumbent is appointed formateur then the party which selects
a coalition partner must always be corrupt. There are two cases. If one of
the other parties is corrupt then Lemma 3.2 implies that the formateur agrees
with the pure party, so Lemma 3.3 implies that citizens cannot vote a hung
parliament because they all prefer the formateur￿s coalition partner in power. If
the other two parties are pure then the formateur must agree with a pure party;
and Lemma 3.3 again implies that citizens can then not vote a hung parliament.
These observations imply that a single party is always in power if the for-
mateur was in the previous government. Lemma 3.4 also holds: the equilibrium
government is that top-ranked by moderates. Consequently, there is generi-
cally a unique ergodic set: M is always in power if corruption is suﬃciently
non-salient; otherwise, M and R alternate in power.
21See, for example, Ansolabehere et al (2005).
17Now suppose that the largest party is sure to be selected as formateur.22
We will argue that equilibrium play coincides with the benchmark model, again
distinguishing between the two cases:
If there are two corrupt parties then Lemma 3.2 implies that the pure party
shares power, irrespective of the formateur￿s identity, just as in the benchmark
model; so Lemma 3.3 implies that citizens cannot vote a hung parliament.
If there are two pure parties then citizens can prevent them from sharing
power when their agreement yields the highest surplus by giving the corrupt
party most votes (making it the formateur). However, this cannot change equi-
librium play because all citizens prefer that the pure party be in power than
that it share power with the corrupt party. If an agreement between the pure
parties yields a lower surplus then citizens can ensure that a particular pure
party shares power by making it formateur. However, this cannot change equi-
librium play because all citizens prefer that the pure party be in power than
that it share power with the corrupt party.
In sum,
Proposition 3.4
a. If a previous incumbent is the formateur then M either alternates in power
with R or is always in power in the unique ergodic set.
b. If the party which secures most votes is the formateur then the ergodic set
coincides with that in the benchmark model.¥
Proposition 3.4 implies that replacing Conditions A-C with a formateur
model either has no eﬀect on equilibrium play or precludes coalition govern-
ments which would form in the benchmark model. Consequently, moderates
can only be harmed by introduction of a formateur mechanism, reinforcing the
suboptimality result of the last subsection. In Section 3.5, we will suggest that
the benchmark model likely underpredicts coalition governments. Models with
a formateur mechanism do not address this issue.
3.4 Two parties
The literature has compared the eﬀects of increasing the number of parties on
observed corruption. There are arguments which cut both ways: on the one
hand, Anderson (2000) argues that, with more parties contesting an election,
citizens face a greater coordination problem in punishing corrupt incumbents
and more uncertainty about the composition of the next coalition government.
An increase in the number of parties therefore makes governing parties less
accountable, and raises corruption. On the other hand, citizens have hetero-
geneous ideal policies in Myerson (1993) and (2006), so they could replace a
corrupt party with an almost identical pure party if there were enough parties.
22We adopt Austen-Smith and Banks￿ (1988) assumption for expositional convenience. Dier-
meier and Merlo (2004) show that the largest party is most likely (but not sure) to be the
formateur.
18An increase in the number of parties therefore makes governing parties more
accountable, and reduces corruption.
In this subsection, we will argue that introduction of a party representing
moderates has an ambiguous eﬀect on corruption. We obtain this result by fully
characterizing one-period equilibria and the ergodic set in a world with three
sorts of citizen and two parties. We label the parties l and r, and suppose that
their ideal policies satisfy
−d − θ ≤ xl < 0 <x r ≤ d.
Our main result in this subsection is
Proposition 3.5 (Two parties)
a. For any pair of tastes {cl,c r}, every generic one-period game has a unique
outcome: l is in power if and only if
4[ε(x2
l − x2
r) − (1 − ε)(xl + xr)] <δ (c2
r − c2
l);
otherwise r is in power.
b. Every generic game has a unique ergodic set: l is always in power and
chooses some graft if
δ<4[(1 − ε)(xl + xr) − ε(x2
l − x2
r)];
r is always in power and chooses some graft if
δ<4[ε(x2
l − x2
r) − (1 − ε)(xl + xr)];
and l and r otherwise alternate in power, with neither government choos-
ing any graft.¥
Proposition 3.5a can be proved by recalling that the two parties are equally
likely to be in power if they share votes equally; by noting that moderates
top-rank the equilibrium government; and by substituting from Lemma 2.1a.
The nature of the ergodic set, and the ensuing corruption, depends on the
opportunity cost for moderates to replace the party whose ideal policy is closest
to 0. Suppose, for simplicity that ε is very small. Proposition 3.2 then implies
that there is corruption in the ergodic set of a three-party world if and only if δ<
4d.I fxl and xr are both close enough to 0 then there is weakly more corruption
in a three-party world, as Myerson￿s (2006) arguments suggest. However, if
xl = −d−θ and xr = d then l cannot always be in power, and there is corruption
in an ergodic set if and only if δ<4θ;s o ,f o r￿xed salience, there is weakly more
corruption in a two-party world if and only if θ<d .23 Tavits (2007) reports
that an increase in the number of eﬀective parties raises corruption; but the
23In contrast to Anderson (2000), the conditions do not depend on uncertainty about gov-
ernment composition because only single-party governments choose graft in our model, and
our solution concept excludes any strategic uncertainty.
19independent variable depends on vote shares, which are not only endogenous in
our model, but are also not uniquely pinned down in equilibrium.
We end this subsection with a calculation. Suppose that ε is very small and
that both parties are corrupt. Moderates prefer the policy which r would choose
in power over that chosen by a coalition government, but prefer the parties to
share power over either party in power if
0 < 4|xl + xr| − 8xr <δ .
This preference is irrelevant here because parties are equally likely to be in
p o w e ri ft h e ys e c u r et h es a m en u m b e ro fv o t e s .W ew i l lr e t u r nt ot h ec o n d i t i o n s
when we discuss bicameralism in the Conclusion.
3.5 Testable implications
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 entail various implications, which we group into four
categories:
1. The composition of government
(a) The only party which can always be in power is M;a n dM is always
in power if the other parties are extreme enough (d is large) and
corruption is non-salient enough;
(b) Extremist L is only in government in an ergodic set when it shares
power;
(c) No coalition or coalitions can always be in power;
(d) Only disconnected parties can share power.
2. Realignment theory
(a) Policy does not change sign across elections;
(b) Incumbency eﬀects are temporary.
3 .T h e r ei so n l yc o r r u p t i o ni na ne r g o d i cs e ti fM is always in power.
4. No party has an incumbency advantage.
Some of the implications about government composition appear to be con-
sistent with the evidence: for example, Implication 1a) seems to square with
the prolonged periods of one-party rule in Japan and Sweden; while 1b) tracks
the Haider-led FPO in Austria. The rotation of power between parties which
rapidly become corrupt is reminiscent of Kenya.
Other implications are more diﬃcult to square with the evidence. First, the
Christian Democrats shared power with essentially the same parties in Italy
from 1948 till 1992; the OVP and the SPO shared power in Austria from 1945
to 1966 and from 1986 to 1999. This seems inconsistent with Implication 1c).
20Implication 1d), which follows from Proposition 3.1, contrasts with the re-
lated literature: one-dimensional spatial models following Axelrod (1970) and
de Swaan (1973) typically imply that any coalitions must be connected; while
Warwick (1994) argues that disconnected coalitions are more unstable.24 The
implication seems empirically problematic: the centrist Fianna Fail party has
shared power in Ireland with the anti-corruption Progressive Democrats since
1989, and with the Greens since 2007; and the notoriously corrupt Christian
Democrats and Socialists shared power in Italy. The associated empirical lit-
erature demonstrates that disconnected coalitions are unusual, especially those
excluding the median party, as exempli￿ed by the breakdown of the FPO-SPO
coalition after Haider￿s takeover of the FPO in 1986.25 The arguments used
to prove Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 do not rely on the possible formation of a dis-
connected coalition; so no coalition could form in equilibrium if disconnected
coalitions were excluded by assumption.
Implication 2 captures two aspects of Mayhew￿s (2002) stylized version of
realignment theory. Both parts follow from the benchmark assumption that M
is absolutely pure after a period in opposition. Mayhew contests the theory￿s
explanatory power for the US, but it may be more plausible for other countries:
for example, the 1945 and 1979 UK elections seem to violate both parts of
Implication 2.
Note that Implication 2 does not include any claims about electoral support,
which are important to realignment theory: our model pins down equilibrium
outcomes rather than equilibrium voting patterns.
Empirical studies of corruption have been predominantly cross-sectional; so
there is little formal evidence on governmental corruption cycles within a given
country.26 Nevertheless, Implication 3 seems too stark: turning out a gov-
ernment may reduce, but does not eliminate corruption. Conversely, parties
which are turned out do not immediately become absolutely pure; so a recent
incumbent may continue to bene￿t from its predecessor￿s poor reputation, as
exempli￿ed by the time it has taken for the Tories to shake oﬀ their image of
sleaze after losing the 1997 election in the UK. Such examples are inconsistent
with Implication 2b).
Implication 4 is clearly false, both in the US and elsewhere. The literature
has explored various reasons for an incumbency advantage, including informa-
tional issues and the ability to direct public resources to constituents. We have
excluded such features from the model.
In the remainder of the paper, we demonstrate that a combination of Ac-
ton￿s dictum with other suppositions can address the empirically problematic
implications of the benchmark model.
24See also Brams et al (2002) on disconnected coalitions when policy is multi-dimensional.
25See Martin and Stevenson (2001)T a b l e1. Iceland, where rents from oﬃce seem relatively
important to parties, is an exception on both counts: less than half of coalitions were connected
between 1944 and 1999 were connected, and coalitions were more likely not to contain the
median party: cf. Indridason (2005).
26See Pellegrini and Gerlagh (forthcoming).
214 Intermediate tastes for graft
The benchmark model has an extreme dynamic theory: any party which was
last in government [resp. opposition] is absolutely corrupt [resp. pure]. In
this section, we consider the ergodic sets of a model in which parties can have
intermediate tastes for graft (viz. c ∈ (0,1)) which evolve in accord with a
weaker form of Acton￿s dictum: a party which was last in government [resp.
opposition] becomes more [resp. less] corrupt.
Various properties of the ergodic set detailed in Proposition 3.2 hold for
dynamic processes which satisfy a pair of weaker but plausible conditions.
￿ In presenting the model in Section 2, we noted that the only diﬀerence
between citizens i and party i is that the latter may have been in govern-
ment. This suggests that a party which is never in government eventually
becomes absolutely pure.
￿ It seems natural to interpret Acton￿s second claim, that absolute power
corrupts absolutely, as asserting that a party which is always in govern-
ment eventually becomes absolutely corrupt.
Consider any dynamic process which satis￿es these two conditions. If this
p r o c e s sy i e l d sa ne r g o d i cs e ti nw h i c hs o m ep a r t yi [resp. j]i sa l w a y si n
government [resp. opposition] then citizens must repeat equilibrium play in
the benchmark model. Proposition 3.1 then implies that no coalition can al-
ways be in power, and that only M can always be in power. Conversely, if
δ<4[εd2 +( 1− ε)d] then any dynamic process has a unique ergodic set, with
M always in power. In sum, Implication 1a) at the end of the last section carries
over when absolute power corrupts absolutely. Analogous arguments imply that
no coalition can then always be in power: so a weak form of Implication 1c)
also carries over. In the remainder of this section, we will show that the other
implications need not hold. Before doing so, we must address a technical issue:
The ergodic set exists and is generically unique in the benchmark model.
Existence does not carry over for generic games when ε is close to 1 (so the
policy cost is almost quadratic) because there are generic one-period games
which do not possess an equilibrium. To see this, note that moderates must
top-rank any equilibrium government (by the argument in Lemma 3.4). Now
suppose that parties enter an election with equal taste for corruption (say, c):
so Lemma 2.1b implies that M and R would share power if parliament hangs. If
δ>2d2/c2 then moderates prefer this coalition over any party being in power.
However, leftists prefer either L or M in power over M and R sharing power if
δ<(10d2 +8 dθ)/c2. Consequently, parliament cannot hang in an equilibrium
if δ satis￿es both conditions.
By contrast, Lemma 3.4 generalizes to every ci ∈ [0,1] when ε is small
enough (policy costs are ￿almost linear￿):
Lemma 4.1 Every generic one-period game in which policy costs are al-
most linear possesses a unique equilibrium outcome. The government
22which forms is that favored by moderates out of the three single-party
governments and the coalition which would form were parliament
hung.
Proof Write the pair of parties who would share power were parliament
hung as {i,j}.
If moderates most prefer some party (say, K) in power over the other parties
in power and {i,j} then K alone can be in power in an equilibrium. Consider a
strategy combination in which all citizens vote for K. By construction, moder-
ates cannot pro￿tably deviate. There are then no alternative governments which
leftists and rightists all prefer over K in power. Conversely, there cannot be a
hung parliament in equilibrium because some leftists or rightists must prefer K
in power over {i,j}.
Now suppose that moderates most prefer {i,j} over any party in power. A
strategy combination in which all citizens vote sincerely forms an equilibrium if
and only if
1.L e f t i s t sp r e f e r{i,j} over either M or R in power; and
2. Rightists prefer {i,j} over either L or M in power.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that i and j choose a negative policy.
1. If moderates prefer i and j sharing power over M in power then aggregate
corruption must be lower in the former case; so leftists must also prefer
i and j sharing power. Furthermore, if moderates prefer i and j sharing
power over R in power then so must leftists.
2. Moderates and rightists share the same preference ordering over i and j
sharing power and L and M in power alone.
There are no other equilibrium outcomes because if moderates prefer a hung
parliament over some party in power then another sort of citizen must share
that preference; and this coalition can ensure that parliament hangs.¥
If policy costs are almost linear then all citizens prefer a hung parliament over
M in power if moderates top-rank a hung parliament. This property precludes
the indirect preference ordering which yields non-existence when policy costs are
almost quadratic for some con￿guration of preferences. Almost-linearity also
allows us to prove Lemma 4.1 without characterizing the coalition government
which would form were parliament to hang (cf. the proof of Lemma 3.4).
Lemma 4.1 implies that games with almost linear policy costs possess an
ergodic set if the set of feasible tastes is ￿nite. In the rest of this section, we
focus on games with almost linear policy costs.
We now present an example of games whose ergodic sets fail Implications
1b), 1d), 2 and 4 at the end of the last section, which respectively state that
L is only in government if it shares power; that only disconnected parties can
share power; that there is only corruption in an ergodic set if M is always in
power; and that government turn-over never changes policy by more than d.
23Example 4.1 Suppose that ε and θ are both very small; that δ>64d; and that
the dynamic process satis￿es the following properties:
￿ If a party which is in opposition with taste 1/4 in some period is in gov-
ernment next period then its taste becomes 3/4;
￿ I fap a r t yw h i c hi si ng o v e r n m e n tw i t ht a s t e3/4 in some period is in
opposition next period then its taste becomes 1/4.¥
If L has taste 3/4 and M and R each have taste 1/4 then M and R would
share power in a hung parliament because δ>12d;27 and moderates prefer this
coalition to share power (over M in power) because δ>64d.C o n v e r s e l y ,i fL has
taste 1/4 and M and R each have taste 3/4 then L and M would share power
in a hung parliament; and moderates prefer L in power over sharing power with
M,a n do v e rM in power because δ>8d. Lemma 4.1 then implies that there
is an ergodic set in which L alternates in power with a coalition of the other
two parties. Consequently, Implications 1b) and 1d) do not carry over from the
benchmark model.
L chooses graft of α/64γ2 when in government, whereas the coalition chooses
graft of α/128γ2 in this ergodic set. Corruption may therefore be cyclical and
always positive, even though M is never in power. Consequently, Implication 2
does not carry over to this model. Indeed, it is easy to construct perturbations
of Example 4.1 in which a succession of newly elected governments are more
corrupt than their predecessors because parties in the preceding government
would have chosen even more graft if re-elected. However, this process cannot
continue inde￿nitely in an ergodic set if absolute power corrupts absolutely.
The cyclicity of corruption represents a pattern of successive, temporarily
eﬀective cleanups. Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991) attribute such a pattern to the
variable in￿ow of seizable assets; whereas corrupt parties deplete the resources
they devote to pork in Bicchieri and Duﬀy( 1997). Corruption is cyclical here
because power corrupts, and relatively corrupt parties lose elections.
Notice that policy switches between −d − θ when L is in power, and d/2
when M and R share power. In other words, policy can change sign across
governments, contradicting Implication 2a).
Finally, we consider the duration of an incumbency eﬀect when tastes can
be intermediate. Governments which are turned out only survive for a single
election in the benchmark model because they immediately become absolutely
corrupt, and the opposition immediately becomes absolutely pure. We illustrate
alternative possibilities by focusing on a simple example:
Suppose that δ>4d and that ε and θ are respectively very small and
very large. Proposition 3.2b then implies that M and R alternate in power
in the ergodic set of the benchmark model, with no government choosing any
graft. Now suppose that a party becomes absolutely corrupt once it is in power,
but that a party which is turned out of government has tastes of 1/2 in the
￿rst period after leaving oﬃce, and becomes absolutely pure thereafter, where
27The arguments in this paragraph follow from Lemma 2.1.
24δ<16d/3.I f M is in power then moderates prefer that M remain in power
than that R immediately return to power. L and M would share power in a
hung parliament if L were absolutely pure; so M w o u l dr e m a i ni np o w e ri n
equilibrium, and would choose some graft in its second term. Proposition 3.2b
implies that M would be replaced in power by R after winning two elections.
On the other hand, moderates always prefer M in power over returning R to
power, and L and R would share power in a hung parliament; so M would be in
power once R has been in power. Thus in the ergodic set, M would be re-elected
once and then replaced in power by R for a single term in oﬃce, contrary to
Implication 2b). This result may illustrate why the Tories, who were unable to
lose their poor reputation, lost subsequent elections after being turned out of
oﬃce in 1997.
This example and our observation above suggest that models with interme-
diate tastes may allow for critical elections, in which policy changes signi￿cantly,
and then persists for several elections.
5 Commitments to coalition partners
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply that a corrupt party can never share power in the
benchmark model. In this section, we demonstrate that a corrupt party may
share power with a pure or with a corrupt party if, contrary to our previous
supposition, parties can precommit to govern with another party or run on a
joint platform. Such commitments are quite common: for example, Fianna
Fail and the Progressive Democrats shared power after the 1997 and 2002 Irish
e l e c t i o n s ,h a v i n gr u no naj o i n tp l a t f o r mi n2 0 0 2 ; 28 and a center-left coalition
won the 2006 Italian election after running together as The Union.29 Golder
(2005) reports that about a quarter of pre-election coalitions in her sample of
23 countries between 1946 and 2002 went on to form a government; while more
than a third of the coalition governments in Strom and Muller￿s (1999) sample
were based on pre-electoral agreements.30
Parties usually claim that their precommitments allow citizens to predict
their behavior in negotiations to form a government. Golder (2005) suggests that
a coalition may secure more votes from risk-averse citizens who cannot anticipate
the coalition which will form in a hung parliament, or that a coalition may obtain
more seats for a given number of votes. Neither of these arguments work in
our model: in particular, the equilibrium-based solution concept precludes any
strategic uncertainty. Golder (2006) tests further hypotheses derived from an
informal discussion of pre-electoral negotiations. We provide a complete model
of pre- and post-electoral bargaining, which shows how parties may precommit
in order to allow corrupt parties to share power.
28Indeed, they were the ￿rst coalition government returned to power since 1969.
29The respective platforms tied parties together rather more than dictating government
choices. Laver and Scho￿eld (1990) discuss earlier international instances.
30Martin and Stevenson (2001) Table 3 provide evidence that parties which precommit to
partners are more likely to share power.
25Speci￿cally, we study a simple variant on the benchmark model in which
parties are active players. Every period starts with each party i simultaneously
announcing a party in the triple {i,j,k}, with the following interpretation. An-
nouncing another party states willingness to share power with that party after
the next elections whenever they jointly receive a majority of votes; if a party
announces itself then it makes no commitments.
Parties jointly commit to share power if and only if they announce each
other. We then say that they ￿form a coalition￿. We suppose that commit-
ments only pertain to sharing power: the government program always splits the
maximal surplus equally. This model therefore retains Conditions A and B on
negotiations, but replaces Condition C (as do the formateur models in Section
3.3).
Citizens observe whether any coalition has formed and then vote, as in pre-
vious sections.31 Speci￿cally, the benchmark three-party game corresponds to
subgames which follow no coalition formation; and the two-party game in Sec-
tion 3.4 corresponds to subgames which follow coalition formation.
The simultaneous move structure in the ￿rst stage may again generate mul-
tiple Nash equilibria. Accordingly, we analyze the game by focusing on pure
strategy equilibria in which no pair of parties can pro￿tably deviate from their
announcements.32
We will focus, for expositional convenience, on games where preferences are
almost linear (ε is very small).33
Proposition 5.1 (Equilibria) Suppose that parties can commit to coalition
partners and that preferences are almost linear.
a. If M is pure then it is in power.
b. If M and R are corrupt then
￿ M is in power if δ<4(d + θ);
￿ M and R share power if 4(d + θ) <δ<min{4d +8 θ,16θ/3};
￿ L is in power if 4d +8 θ<δ ;a n d




θ,4(d + θ)} <δ<4d +8 θ.
c. If L and M are corrupt then M is in power if δ<4d;a n dR is otherwise
in power.
d. If M alone is corrupt then
31Our results would also hold if parties which formed a coalition ran a single slate of can-
didates.
32We do not allow for joint deviations of citizens and parties.
33This assumption is not responsible for the existence of games without a pure strategy
equilibrium.
26￿ M is in power if δ<min{4d,2θ};
￿ L and R share power if 16θ<δ<4d;o rθ<2d and either
min{16θ,4(2d + θ)} <δor 8(2d + θ) <δ ;
￿ M and R share power if θ<2d and 4(2d+θ)} <δ<min{16θ,8(2d+
θ)};
￿ R is in power if 4d<δand if 2d<θor δ<4(2d + θ);a n d
￿ T h e r ei sn op u r es t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i u mi f 2θ<δ<min{16θ,4d}.¥
We prove Proposition 5.1 in the Appendix. Part a is trivial. We prove the
remaining parts by noting that a party in power in the benchmark model would
not commit to share power in any equilibrium. We then test for pro￿table joint
deviations by parties, given citizens￿ best responses, from putative equilibria in
which the remaining governments form. An equilibrium does not exist when L
alone is pure if salience is such that every coalition would win an election, and
L would win if no coalition formed.
Proposition 5.1 demonstrates that policy-connected parties (M and R)c a n
form a coalition, whereas coalition governments which form absent commitments
are policy-disconnected. These results are supported by Golder￿s (2006) cross-
country evidence.
A pure party never shares power with a corrupt party in the benchmark
model (cf. Lemma 3.3). This result relies on Lemma 2.1b, which states that such
a coalition would agree to the pure party￿s ideal policy and some corruption. All
citizens then prefer that the pure party be in power than that it share power with
a corrupt party. Proposition 5.1 demonstrates that equilibrium commitments
can prevent citizens from unravelling such a putative coalition (when M is the
only corrupt party).
Two corrupt parties never share power in the benchmark model (cf. Lemma
3.2) because a corrupt party prefers to share power with a pure party in a
hung parliament. Proposition 5.1 implies that two corrupt parties which would
otherwise be excluded from power might commit to sharing power, and thereby
prevent such a coalition from unravelling during inter-party negotiations. This
coalition wins the election if it internalizes the cost of graft suﬃciently that
moderates prefer these parties to share power over either being in power.
We argued in Section 3.1 that no party has an incumbency advantage in the
benchmark model. In this section￿s model, M and R may share power when
both are corrupt, but M w o u l db ei np o w e ri fL were corrupt. Consequently,
R has an incumbency advantage for these parameters, contrary to Implication
3a).34
Proposition 5.1 immediately implies
Proposition 5.2 (Ergodic sets) Suppose that parties can commit to coali-
tion partners and that preferences are almost linear.
34L and M only have an incumbency disadvantage.
27a. If 16θ<δ<4d or if
θ<2d and min{16θ,4(2d + θ)} <δor 8(2d + θ) <δ
then there is an ergodic set in which M is in power in alternate periods,
and L and R share power in the other periods. No government chooses
any graft. Moderates earn 0 and about −βθ/2 in alternate periods.
b. If 4d<δand if 2d<θor δ<4(2d + θ) then there is an ergodic set in
which M and R alternate in power, and neither government chooses any
graft. Moderates earn 0 and about −βd in alternate periods.
c. If δ<min{4d,2θ} then there is an ergodic set in which M is always in
power, and always chooses some graft. Moderates earn −α/4γ each period.
d. If 4(d+θ) <δ<min{4d+8θ,16θ/3} then there is an ergodic set in which
M and R always share power, and always choose some graft. Moderates
earn about −βd/2 − α/8γ each period.¥
Proposition 5.2d demonstrates that two connected parties may always share
power, contrary to Implications 1c) and 1d) of the benchmark model.
There are no ergodic sets for some parameters, such as δ ∈ (2θ,min{16θ,4d}),
because the one-period game with M alone corrupt has no equilibrium. In fur-
ther contrast to the benchmark model, a given game may have several ergodic
sets, for example if
4(d + θ) <δ<min{4d +8 θ,16θ/3,4(2d + θ)}.35
Proposition 5.2d speci￿es conditions under which two corrupt parties always
share power. Under these conditions, M would alternate in power with R in
the ergodic set of the benchmark model. Proposition 3.2b then implies that
moderates are better oﬀ in every period in the benchmark model than in this
ergodic set of the commitment game, which is therefore suboptimal in the sense
de￿ned in Section 3.2.36
6 Expressive voting
In Section 3, we demonstrated that a pure and a corrupt party never share
power if citizens are sophisticated: for they recognize that such a government
would choose the pure party￿s ideal policy and some corruption, and would
therefore be better oﬀ with the pure party in power. In this section, we amend
the benchmark model by supposing that citizens vote for the party which they
w o u l dm o s tl i k ei np o w e r .D o w n s( 1957) famously supports this assumption in
his Proposition 25, arguing that citizens cannot anticipate the outcome of inter-
party negotiations. Given this assumption and our further supposition that
36The results in this paragraph do not rely on the supposition that preferences are almost
linear.
28moderates are not a majority of citizens, it is not surprising that a corrupt and
a pure party can share power. Our main result in this section is much stronger:
the unique ergodic set either consists of M and R alternating in power or of a
pure and a corrupt party in power every period.
Formally, we suppose that each citizen compares the policy and graft that
each party would choose in power (as described in Lemma 2.1a), and votes the
party which she most prefers: behavior which we describe as ￿expressive voting￿.
Citizens i may most prefer party j 6= i in power, so expressive citizens need not
vote sincerely.
We also adopt two assumptions which simplify exposition: we suppose that
policy costs are almost linear; and we exclude cases in which a majority of
citizens are moderates.37
This combination of conditions implies that voting often generates hung par-
liaments: a possibility that citizens do not factor into their voting. Accordingly,
the solution concept which we use in this section requires that inter-party nego-
tiations satisfy Conditions A-C in Section 2 and Lemma 2.1, and that citizens
vote expressively. We will abuse terminology by again referring to such strat-
egy combinations as ￿equilibria￿, and will use these strategy combinations to
construct long-run cycles which we refer to as ￿ergodic sets￿.
We start with some simple properties of this model:
Lemma 6.1 If citizens vote expressively then all citizens of the same sort vote
the same party: each citizen votes sincerely when its party is pure;
and if a citizen votes for another party then that party must be pure.¥
We omit this and subsequent proofs in this section.
We can now use Lemmas 2.1,3 . 2a n d6 . 1 to characterize equilibria. We
organize Proposition 6.1 in terms of the number of corrupt parties because, in
contrast to the benchmark model, a pure party M need not be in power.
Proposition 6.1 (Equilibria) Suppose that citizens vote expressively and that
preferences are almost linear.
a. One corrupt party:
￿ If i ∈ {M,R} alone is corrupt then it shares power with one of the
pure parties if δ<4d,a n dj 6= i ∈ {M,R} is in power otherwise.
￿ If L alone is corrupt then it shares power with one of the pure parties
if δ<4(d + θ),a n dM is in power otherwise.
b. O n ep u r ep a r t y
￿ If i ∈ {M,R} alone is pure then it shares power with one of the
corrupt parties if δ<4d, and is otherwise in power.
37If moderates were in a majority then M is either always in power or always alternates in
power with R.
29￿ If L is the only pure party then it shares power with one of the corrupt
parties if δ<4(d + θ), and is otherwise in power.¥
A pure and a corrupt party cannot share power in the benchmark model be-
c a u s es o m ec i t i z e n sc a np r o ￿tably deviate to voting for the pure party. By con-
trast, citizens who vote expressively ignore the outcome of negotiations. Lemma
3.3 therefore fails in this model, and a pure and a corrupt party can share power
in equilibrium.
Proposition 6.1a implies that incumbency may be advantageous if corruption
is suﬃciently non-salient: a party may then share power if and only if it (rather
than another party) is alone corrupt, contrary to Implication 3a).
Lemma 2.1b implies that agreements between a pure and a corrupt party
yield a surplus which is independent of their identities. Consequently, one-period
games may have multiple equilibrium outcomes if citizens vote expressively.38
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply that only pure parties can share power in the
benchmark model. Lemma 3.2, whose proof relies on inter-party negotiations,
still holds in this model; so corrupt parties cannot share power when citizens
vote expressively. By contrast, Lemma 3.3 relies on strategic voting. Indeed,
Proposition 6.1 implies that any coalition government must consist of a pure
and a corrupt party.
We now use Proposition 6.1 to characterize ergodic sets:
Proposition 6.2 (Ergodic sets) Suppose that citizens vote expressively and
that preferences are almost linear.
a. If δ<4d then a pure party shares power with a corrupt party each period
in every ergodic set, and the government always chooses some graft.
b. If δ>4d then there is a unique ergodic set in which M alternates in power
with R, and no government chooses any graft.¥
The proof of Proposition 6.2a exploits the possible multiplicity of equilibrium
outcomes to construct multiple ergodic sets when δ<4d. L is then always in
power in an ergodic set, contrary to Implications 1a) and 1b) of the benchmark
model, where it is never in power in an ergodic set.
Proposition 6.2 does not specify moderate payoﬀs because it does not pin
down the government￿s policy.
Proposition 6.2a may explain why the ultra-orthodox party Shas has shared
power (with rare exceptions) since 1990. Shas is primarily concerned with public
funding of its educational system, and has participated in governments led by
both Rabin and Netanyahu. While corruption is clearly salient in Israel, it is
not salient enough relative to diﬀerences on policy towards the Palestinians.39
If citizens vote strategically then moderates must top-rank the equilibrium
g o v e r n m e n t ,e l s es o m ec i t i z e n sh a v eap r o ￿table joint deviation; so M must be
38Uniqueness would be restored if tastes were intermediate.
39This interpretation admittedly stretches our notion of graft, as Shas voters are its main
bene￿ciaries.
30in power if d is large enough. Proposition 6.2 implies that these properties do
n o te v e nh o l di na ne r g o d i cs e t :i fδ<4d then all citizens vote sincerely, and the
equilibrium government chooses the pure party￿s policy, no matter how extreme
that might be. Elections may therefore be critical, contrary to Implication 2a)
of the benchmark model.
If citizens vote strategically and parties are either absolutely pure or corrupt
then governments only lose elections when they are corrupt and the opposition
is pure. This turnover then ensures that governing parties are always pure (cf.
Propositions 3.2 and 5.2). By contrast, Proposition 6.2a implies that expres-
sive voters may replace governments without reducing corruption, contrary to
Implication 2.
Proposition 3.1 implies that only policy-disconnected parties can share power
(Implication 1d); Proposition 3.2 implies that, in every ergodic set, a party is
sometimes in power. Proposition 6.2 implies that neither property generalizes
to a model with expressive voting.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented and analyzed some simple models of a dynamic democracy
in an environment which is stationary except for the corrupting eﬀect of power,
arguing that our results may shed light on some stylized facts about government
composition. However, our focus on a stationary environment may limit the
model￿s empirical power.
We have focused on the implications of inter-party negotiations for citizens￿
ability to turn out a corrupt government. In our unicameral model, parties only
negotiate if parliament is hung: which is impossible with two parties. However,
inter-party negotiations are pertinent in a variant on our model with two parties
and citizens who vote both for Congress and the Presidency:
The calculations in Section 3.4 reveal that moderates may split their votes
in equilibrium if corruption is salient enough, even though they prefer the policy
which a party would choose in power. By contrast, moderates split their votes
because they prefer the compromise policy agreed by a divided government
in Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and Fiorina (1996). Alesina and Rosenthal
also argue that the President￿s party typically loses seats in mid-term elections
because the distribution of ideal policies is not commonly known; so citizens are
surprised by the results of simultaneous elections. (See also Mebane and Sekhon
(2002).) We have excluded any incomplete information, but our model suggests
that the corrupting eﬀect of power might explain mid-term losses: which seems
like a more plausible explanation of the 2006 Congressional elections, among
others.
We have followed conventional wisdom by assuming that Acton￿s dictum is
correct. We have suggested various a priori reasons for the dictum, but our
model could be naturally extended by providing testable micro-foundations.
More generally, it seems important to provide evidence on the empirical signif-
icance of the dictum. Unfortunately, the evidence available, like Transparency
31International￿s Corruption Perceptions Index, are built up from surveys which
ask about governmental and bureaucratic corruption as a whole and cannot re-
ally capture governmental corruption in itself (cf. Treisman (2000)). Moreover,
these series seem to change too slowly to test for changing corruption (cf. Tavits
(2007)), and do not separate graft from pork.
REFERENCES
Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal (1996), "A Theory of Divided Government"
Econometrica 64, 1311-1341.
Anderson, C. (2000), ￿Economic Voting and Political Context￿ Electoral
Studies 19, 151-170.
Ansolabehere, S., J. Snyder, A. Strauss and M. Ting (2005), ￿Voting Weights
and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments￿ Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 49, 550-563.
Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1988), ￿Elections, Coalitions and Legislative
Outcomes￿ American Political Science Review 82, 405-422.
Axelrod, R. (1970) Con￿ict of Interest Markham, Chicago.
Baron, D. (1991), ￿Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Pro-
cedural Control￿ American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90.
Baron, D. (1996), ￿A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs￿ Amer-
ican Political Science Review 90, 316-330.
Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2001), ￿Elections, Governments and Parlia-
ments in Proportional Representation Systems￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics
116, 933-967.
Baron, D., D. Diermeier and P. Fong (2007), ￿Policy Dynamics and In-
eﬃciency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation￿,
mimeo.
Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), ￿Bargaining in Legislatures￿ American
Political Science Review 83, 1181-1206.
Besley, T. and S. Coate (1997), ￿An Economic Model of Representative
Democracy￿ Quarterly Journal of Ecoomics 112, 85-114.
Bicchieri, C. and J. Duﬀy( 1997), ￿Corruption Cycles￿ Political Studies 45,
477-495.
Brams, S., M. Jones and D. Kilgour (2002), ￿Single-peakedness, Coalition
Formation and Disconnected Coalitions￿ Journal of Theoretical Politics 14,
359-383.
della Porta, D. and A. Pizzorno (1996), ￿The Business Politicians: Re￿ec-
tions from a Study of Political Corruption￿ in M. Levi and D. Nelken eds. The
Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption Blackwell, Oxford.
de Swaan, A. (1973) Coalition Theories and Government Formation Else-
vier, Amsterdam.
Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan and A. Merlo (2003), ￿A Structural Model of
Government Formation￿ Econometrica 71,2 7 - 7 0 .
Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004), ￿An Empirical Investigation of Coali-
tional Bargaining Procedures￿ Journal of Public Economics 88, 783-797.
32Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy Harper and Row,
New York.
Epstein, L. & J. Segal (2000). ￿Measuring Issue Salience￿ American Journal
of Political Science 44, 66-83.
Esteban, J. and D. Ray (1994), ￿On the Measurement of Polarization￿
Econometrica 62, 819-851.
Fiorina, M. (1996), Divided Government Allyn & Bacon, Boston, 2nd edi-
tion.
Gillespie, K. and G. Okruhlik (1991), ￿The Political Dimensions of Corrup-
tion Cleanups￿ Comparative Politics 24, 77-95.
Golder, S. (2005), ￿Pre-electoral Coalitions in Comparative Perspective￿
Electoral Studies 24, 643-663.
Golder, S. (2006), ￿Pre-electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democ-
racies￿ British Journal of Political Science 36, 193-212.
Hauk, E. and M. Saez-Marti (2002), ￿On the Cultural Transmission of Cor-
ruption￿ Journal of Economic Theory 107, 311-335.
Indridason, I. (2005), ￿A Theory of Coalitions and Clientilism￿ European
Journal of Political Research 44, 439-464.
Laver, M. and N. Scho￿eld (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics of
Coalition in Europe Oxford University Press, Oxford.
M a r t i n ,L .a n dR .S t e v e n s o n( 2 0 0 1), ￿Government Formation in Parliamen-
tary Democracies￿ American Journal of Political Science 45, 33-50.
Mayhew, D. (2002), Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American
Genre Yale University Press, New Haven.
Mebane, W. and J. Sekhon (2002), ￿Coordination and Policy Moderation at
Midterm￿ American Political Science Review 96, 141-157.
Myerson, R. (1993), "Eﬀectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Gov-
ernment Corruption" Games and Economic Behavior 5, 118-132.
Myerson, R. (2006), ￿Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption￿
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108, 727-742.
Pellegrini, L. and R. Gerlagh (forthcoming), ￿Causes of corruption: a survey
of cross-country analyses and extended results￿ Economics of Governance
Rundquist, B., G. Strom and J. Peters (1977), ￿Corrupt Politicians and their
Electoral Support￿ American Political Science Review 71, 954-963.
Strom, K. and W. Muller (1999), ￿The Keys to Togetherness￿ Journal of
Legislative Studies 5, 255-282.
Tavits, M. (2007), ￿Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption￿ American
Journal of Political Science 51,2 18-229.
Volden, C. and A. Wiseman (2007), "Bargaining in Legislatures over Partic-
ularistic and Collective Goods" American Political Science Review 101, 79-92.
Warwick, P. (1994) Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weinstein, J. (2005), ￿Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Re-
cruitment￿ Journal of Con￿ict Resolution 49, 598-624.
33APPENDIX
Lemma 2.1
a. If i is in power then it chooses a policy of xi and graft of αc2
i/4γ2;s os o r t
k citizens earn
−β[ε(xi − xk)2 +( 1− ε)|xi − xk|] − αc2
i/4γ.
b. Let xi <x j and write
1
2 − ci − cj





If i and j share power then they agree to respective graft of αc2
i/16γ2 and
αc2
j/16γ2.T h e ya g r e et oap o l i c yo f (xi + xj)/2 if ci = cj =1or ε =0
and ci = cj;o t h e r w i s e ,t h e ya g r e et oap o l i c yo f xi if X ≤ xi,o f xj if
X ≥ xj,a n do f X otherwise. Sort k citizens earn






if parties i and j share power and choose policy x.
￿ If i and j agree to policy xi then the program yields a surplus of






￿ If i and j agree to policy xj then the program yields a surplus of






￿ If i and j agree to policy X then the program yields a surplus of
−β{
(1 − ci)(1 − cj)
2 − ci − cj












Note that X ∈ [xi,x j] if ε =1 .
We phrase Lemma 2.1 in terms of {xi} in order to cover games with either
two or three parties, and allow for every ci ∈ [0,1] to cover the intermediate
tastes which we discuss in Section 4.
The proof of part a is trivial. (Recall our assumption that party i chooses
xi even if it is absolutely corrupt.)
34The graft speci￿ed in part b maximize the surplus, vi(x,y)+vj(x,y),w i t h
respect to y. Substitution into uk(x,y) yields the payoﬀ of sort k citizens.
Eﬃciency (Condition B in Section 2) requires parties i and j to agree to a
policy in [xi,x j]. Policy X maximizes the surplus with respect to x, and equals
(xi +xj)/2 when ci = cj. The agreed policies then follow because the surplus is
strictly concave in x. The remainder of the Proposition follows by substituting
the program into vi(x,y)+vj(x,y).
Example 2.1 Each party￿s payoﬀ function is




where α is close enough to 0.¥
If payoﬀ functions satisfy Example 2.1 then a corrupt party would choose
fewer graft than a coalition of two corrupt parties.
Proposition 5.1 (Equilibria) Suppose that parties can commit to coalition
partners and that preferences are almost linear.
a. If M is pure then it is in power.
b. If M and R are corrupt then
￿ M is in power if δ<4(d + θ);
￿ M and R share power if 4(d + θ) <δ<min{4d +8 θ,16θ/3};
￿ L is in power if 4d +8 θ<δ ;a n d




θ,4(d + θ)} <δ<4d +8 θ.
c. If L and M are corrupt then M is in power if δ<4d;a n dR is otherwise
in power.
d. If M alone is corrupt then
￿ M is in power if δ<min{4d,2θ};
￿ L and R share power if 16θ<δ<4d;o rθ<2d and either
min{16θ,4(2d + θ)} <δor 8(2d + θ) <δ ;
￿ M and R share power if θ<2d and 4(2d+θ)} <δ<min{16θ,8(2d+
θ)};
￿ R is in power if 4d<δand if 2d<θor δ<4(2d + θ);a n d
￿ T h e r ei sn op u r es t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i u mi f 2θ<δ<min{16θ,4d}.
35Proof
a. Obvious.
b. Proposition 3.1b implies that, absent any commitments, L would be in
power if 4(d + θ) <δ ,a n dt h a tM would otherwise be in power.
If δ<4(d + θ) then M cannot share power, and a coalition between L and
R would lose the election; so M is in power in every equilibrium.
Now suppose that 4(d+θ) <δ . L cannot share power, as it could pro￿tably
deviate to announcing itself. Consequently, there are two possible pure strategy
equilibrium outcomes: either L wins the election (possibly against a coaliltion
of M and R)o rM and R form a coalition and win the election.
If 4d+8θ<δthen M and R would lose the election if they formed a coalition;
so L is in power in every equilibrium. Accordingly, suppose otherwise.
Lemma 2.1 implies that a corrupt party prefers to share power with a pure
than with another corrupt party. Consequently, M and R only share power
in an equilibrium if L loses the election after forming a coalition, else L and
another party could pro￿tably deviate by announcing each other: that is, if
δ<16θ/3.B o t h M and R prefer to share power over L being in power,
so there is an equilibrium in which they form a coalition and share power if





θ,4(d + θ)} <δ<4d +8 θ.
c. Proposition 3.1c implies that, absent any commitments, M is in power if
δ<4d and R is otherwise in power. If δ<4d then M cannot share power. M
is in power in every equilibrium because δ<4d implies that M would win the
election, irrespective of whether L and R form a coalition.
If δ>4d then R cannot share power, and a coalition of L and M would lose
the election; so R is in power in every equilibrium.
d. Proposition 3.1d implies that, absent any commitments, M is in power if
δ<4d; L shares power with R if θ<2d and 4(2d+θ) <δ ;a n dR is otherwise in
power. Furthermore, a coalition of L and M would lose the election; a coalition
of L and R would lose the election if δ<2d; and a coalition of M and R would
lose the election if and only if 16θ<δ .
Suppose that δ<4d. M cannot share power so, in any equiilibrium, either
M is in power or L and R form a coalition and share power. If δ<2θ then a
coalition of L and R would lose the election, so M is in power in equilibrium.
If 16θ<δ<4d then L and R form a coalition in equilibrium because they win
the election, and a coalition of M and R would lose the election. If 2θ<δ<
min{16θ,4d} then there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Now suppose that θ<2d and 4(2d+θ) <δ . L and R then earn −β(2d+θ)/2
if no coalitions form. L and R share power in equilibrium if a coalition of M
and R would lose the election or if R prefers to share power with L than with
M. These conditions are respectively satis￿ed if 16θ<δand 8(2d + θ) <δ .
If neither condition holds then M and R form a coalition and share power in
equilibrium.
36If R is in power, absent any commitments, then either R is in power or L and
M form a coalition and share power in any equilibrium. However, a coalition of
L and M would lose the election, so R is in power in every equilibrium.¥
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